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PHYSICIAN, HEAL THYSELF: DISCRETION AND
THE PROBLEM OF EXCESSIVE
PROSECUTORIAL CASELOADS, A RESPONSE
TO ADAM GERSHOWITZ AND LAURA
KILLINGER
Josh Bowers
I applaud Adam Gershowitz and Laura Killinger for identifying and
exploring an almost unconsidered problem: excessive prosecutorial
caseloads.1 Their premise is that in many large jurisdictions, prosecutors
are so overworked that they cannot adequately individualize guilty pleas,
assess eligibility and need for rehabilitative programs, comply with
disclosure obligations and speedy-trial rules, and (more generally) separate
the legally and equitably innocent from the guilty. Consequently, excessive
prosecutorial caseloads have the capacity to burden not only district
attorneys’ offices but also criminal defendants.
It is no easy feat to recognize a fresh and practically important problem
in a criminal justice system that—though shot-through with pathologies—
has no shortage of critics on the lookout to spot them. For that reason
alone, their article is a valuable contribution to the literature. It is all the
more impressive that they chart this new territory so well. Nevertheless, I
have three principal concerns. First, I sense that the problem is not nearly
as pervasive as they take it to be. Second, I believe that prosecutors do not
so much lack the ability as the will to manage ballooning caseloads (and, if
I am right, this profoundly changes the takeaway). Third, I foresee a
number of reasons—many of which the authors leave unaddressed—to
worry far more about excessive public-defender caseloads than
prosecutorial caseloads.
I. THE EMPIRICAL CLAIM
My first question is whether prosecutors are genuinely overtaxed and,
if so, to what extent. On that score, I do not read the data to adequately
support the authors’ central claim that the problem is chronic. Of course,
we must first settle on a benchmark for what constitutes an excessive
prosecutorial caseload. According to the authors, the prosecutorial standard
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ought to track the standard for public defense. On these terms, a prosecutor
should carry ―no more than 150 felonies or 400 misdemeanors.‖2
As an initial matter, I am not certain that I agree. As I discuss in Part
III, it may not be necessary (or even proper) to apply the same aspirational
standards to both prosecutors and public defenders. Nevertheless, for
present purposes, I take the measure as appropriate. As such, I gather that
the authors would agree that a mixed-caseload prosecutor (who splits her
time evenly between felony and misdemeanor cases) ought to handle no
more than 75 felonies and 200 misdemeanors—in other words, half of each
of the maximum standalone figures. If that is correct, then the authors have
a problem: in more than half of the twenty-four counties examined in a
national study on which the authors heavily rely, prosecutorial caseloads
were radically under one figure and/or the other, or nominally under both.
And in an additional four counties, prosecutorial caseloads just barely
exceeded the recommended maximums—Orange County (76 felonies, 202
misdemeanors), San Bernardino County (92 felonies, 176 misdemeanors),
Tarrant County (99 felonies, 179 misdemeanors), and Bexar County (70
felonies, 221 misdemeanors). Remarkably, in only two counties—Harris
County and Clark County—were prosecutors, on balance, handling more
than the 150-felony figure (and, even there, not by much: 165 and 166
felonies per prosecutor, respectively). More striking, in no county were
prosecutors averaging more than 400 misdemeanors.3
The authors seem to anticipate the objection that the national study
leaves the empirical question open. In response, they cite to email and
telephone conversations with prosecutors to back their claim that the
caseload figures are, in fact, far higher.4 I see no good reason to prefer
anecdotal self-reports to the empirics of the national study. First, even
good-faith estimates are less likely to be accurate than hard findings.
Second, prosecutors (and, for that matter, public defenders, judges, court
staff, police officers—almost all employees, really) have vested interests
(e.g., maximizing resources and leisure, minimizing stress) in perpetuating
perceptions that they are overworked and underfunded.
I am similarly skeptical of the authors’ assertion that the national study
understates the caseload problem by including in the calculation supervisors
who handle few, if any, cases.5 Why should a supervisor be excluded when
determining the per capita caseload? Presumably, she is helping junior
attorneys handle their cases by providing guidance and feedback and by
filling in when these prosecutors are on trial on other cases or are otherwise
indisposed. If the supervisor is not a valuable part of the team, then she
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ought to be fired and her position eliminated—or, at a minimum, she ought
to start picking up cases.
In the same vein, I do not buy the authors’ claim that we should
exclude from the calculation ―attorneys whose sole job [i]s to screen
cases.‖6 Like supervisors, these specialized attorneys perform useful
functions. I would think that what is true of the industrial assembly line
holds for criminal courts: all else equal, horizontal practice (in which labor
is divided) is probably more efficient than vertical practice (in which an
assigned lawyer remains with a case from start to finish).7 If that is not so,
then the prosecution office may simply transition to vertical representation.
Short of that, I see no reason to exclude from the mix lawyers who handle
only discrete tasks.
Nevertheless, I take the authors’ general point, and I recognize that—
even if we were to focus without caveat on only the national study’s data—
there remain six of twenty-four counties where caseloads appear to have
surpassed the authors’ measure of excessiveness. And, significantly, these
counties encompass the major metropolitan areas of Chicago, Miami, Fort
Lauderdale, Las Vegas, Houston, and Dallas. Thus, the authors have
identified a genuine problem that, at a minimum, affects hundreds of
thousands of criminal cases each year.
II. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE MISDEMEANOR CASE
On to my principal concern: I wonder whether even the obviously
overburdened prosecutor is truly as helpless as the authors perceive her to
be. What the authors appear to have largely missed is the fact that the
prosecutor helps make the cases, whereas the public defender only takes
them. Thus, the prosecutor has a mechanism to ease her own pain—that is,
prosecutorial discretion.
And the authority to exercise discretion matters. It differentiates the
reactive public defender, who struggles to keep pace with the assembly line,
from the prosecutor, who feeds the machine. More to the point, district
attorneys’ offices retain almost unfettered legal authority to decline or
dismiss charges. Granted, too many declinations or dismissals would illserve the public interest and might be politically unpopular (to the extent
the public grasped the decisions). But in some types of cases, there may be
more play in the joints than in others.
In particular, when it comes to charging discretion, petty ordermaintenance cases present something of a puzzle: it is in this context that
prosecutors appropriately may decline or dismiss cases to ease their
6
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caseload burden. Yet it is also in this context that prosecutors are
particularly unwilling to do so because prosecutors operate under a set of
institutional and cognitive biases that motivate them to charge petty cases
reflexively.8 Indeed, in a separate article, I provided data that revealed
that—perhaps counterintuitively—prosecutors tended to decline petty
order-maintenance charges at rates significantly lower than serious felony
charges.9 There, I offered a number of tentative reasons for this
phenomenon.
First, professional prosecutors are trained—by education and
experience—to sort cases into legal categories and thereby to resist
contextual signals that may set a specific case apart from the mine-run.
Significantly, this inclination toward broad categorization over
individualization is a particular problem when it comes to petty publicorder cases, which tend to appear fungible at first glance. Specifically,
public-order cases are almost always products of proactive ordermaintenance policing. In these cases, police typically make arrests based
on firsthand observation of apparent crime, and prosecutors thereafter
typically take at face value the officers’ skeletal arrest paperwork (often the
only information available at the point of charge). Consequently,
prosecutors are less likely to spot legally or equitably atypical petty publicorder cases than atypical serious felony cases. Second, even where legal or
equitable weakness is apparent, prosecutors carry a presumption of guilt
that partially blinds them to potentially good reasons to forego charges.
Third, prosecutors are motivated to charge rather than decline petty cases
because they can quickly and cheaply bargain for expedient guilty pleas that
bolster conviction records—a principal performance measure. Fourth,
prosecutors know that in the unlikely event of trial, they can better rely on
police witnesses to appear and testify credibly (or, at least, in manners that
appear credible). These biases add up to a powerful prosecutorial impulse
to file a low-level charge whenever a low-level charge is merely
cognizable—even in circumstances where the charge is not required (or
even warranted) by retributive or instrumental principles.10
More importantly, because prosecutors may underexercise their
considerable charging discretion, the problem of excessive prosecutorial
caseloads, in fact, may be a problem (at least partially) of prosecutors’ own
making. This is not to say that prosecutors are to blame for acting
rationally in the face of prevailing perverse incentives, but it does not
translate that prosecutors are powerless or that the biases are intractable. It
does mean that the caseload question is no isolated question—it is

8
Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1704 (2010) (link).
9
Id. at 1716 tbl.1, 1717 tbls.2 & 3, 1720 tbl.4.
10
Id. at 1688–1705.
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inexorably bound up with (and, indeed, secondary to) the discretion
question.
Notice, however, how the authors gloss over the discretion question by
(almost certainly unintentionally) relying on the passive voice. In their
terms, prosecutors ―are asked to commit malpractice on a daily basis‖ and
prosecutors ―are tasked with handling far too many cases.‖11 But of course,
no one tasks prosecutors with handling cases (except, perhaps, supervisors
who may demand charges).12 Prosecutors task themselves through their
own discretionary choices. If the tasks are too large, prosecutors have
significant authority—even if they lack sufficient motivation—to change
course. Thus, the difficulty for the authors is that they are trying to solve an
incomplete puzzle. They foresee only a ―lack [of] time and resources‖ as
standing between the prosecutor ―achiev[ing] justice‖ and ―win[ning] at all
costs.‖13 However, in jurisdictions that focus heavily on public-order
enforcement, the problem is more a lack of will—the unwillingness to
determine whether a given case is legally or equitably weak or strong.
In such a setting, real reform would require institutional redesign to
counteract the biases that produce unreflective charging. To that end,
Ronald Wright and Marc Miller have recommended that prosecution offices
create in-house ―hard screening‖ units, modeled after the one in place at the
New Orleans District Attorney’s Office.14 For my part, I have suggested an
external lay equitable screen that might check otherwise poorly restrained
prosecutorial charging discretion.15 By contrast, Gershowitz and Killinger
propose only to throw money at the problem. Such a solution is less likely
to succeed because it disregards the pathology that underlies the problem
(that is, the underexercise of charging discretion) in favor of treating only
the symptom (that is, the consequent excessive caseloads). Worse still, by
leaving the underlying problem unaddressed, the authors’ proposal may
enable prosecutors to charge more cases still, as even the authors seem to

11

Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 1, at 263, 266 (emphasis added). Indeed, the phrase ―tasked
with‖ appears three times throughout the article. Id. at 266, 267, 301.
12
I recognize that prosecution offices tend to be hierarchical, and, as such, supervisors may
constrain the ability of line prosecutors to exercise discretion. But such constraints are internal to the
office. Critically, if a given district attorney’s office concludes that it would be wiser to give line
prosecutors freer reign, it may organize accordingly. Thus, the problem—to the extent one exists—
remains in house. My whole premise is that prosecution offices have significant—but too often
unexercised—authority to minimize their own excessive caseloads. That is to say, prosecution offices
have the power to heal themselves (at least partially). Nothing about the hierarchical structure of the
typical prosecution office undermines that premise.
13
Id. at 264.
14
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15
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recognize.16 In fact, as long as the pathology remains, a lack of resources
may be the best available check against overzealous prosecution.
Of course, the power of this charging pathology depends upon the
degree to which order-maintenance policing (and thus prosecution) is a
priority in a given jurisdiction. The national study’s data seems to show
that different counties have adopted radically different approaches to
misdemeanor enforcement. For example, New York City prosecutors
charged ten times as many misdemeanors as felonies, whereas Phoenix
prosecutors took an almost categorically opposite approach, charging eight
times as many felonies as misdemeanors. The authors make no mention of
this disparity. They see only excessive caseloads in the data. By contrast, I
see a need to parse the cases according to their type and thereafter to pause
and ask what decisions inform these startling imbalances. The answer
could be benign—say, differences in the substantive law across states. That
is, Arizona may treat as a felony the kind of conduct that New York treats
as only a misdemeanor. But I am skeptical that this is the case. I suspect
the answer has much more to do with an executive policy determination—
informed by the ―broken-windows‖ theory—to focus on low-level ordermaintenance offenses in New York City.17
I understand that the decision to prioritize aggressive ordermaintenance enforcement is not indefensible (though I do not support it),
but critically, the decision is not inevitable either.18 In any event, I am
willing to table the larger debate and speculate only that New York City’s
ten-to-one ratio of misdemeanors to felonies seems sufficiently imbalanced
to raise serious questions about whether prosecutors are exercising charging
discretion appropriately.19 One further caveat: by this I do not mean to
downplay the societal and private costs of the kinds of conduct covered by
misdemeanor code law. From a retributive perspective, misdemeanants
may be normatively blameworthy. Moreover, from an instrumental
perspective, effective crime control may require that we prosecute and
punish misdemeanor offenders to some degree. Accordingly, my position
is not that a case is dispensable by virtue of being a misdemeanor; rather,
just that it might be insofar as misdemeanants are less likely than felons to
cause harm that requires prosecution. Thus, especially in misdemeanor
cases, some amount of measured discretion is not just permissible, but
essential.

16

Gershowitz and Killinger, supra note 1, at 298 (―Prosecutors’ offices may use the added
manpower to simply file more charges.‖).
17
See generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN
WINDOWS POLICING (2001) (describing and criticizing public-order crime enforcement in New York
City); Josh Bowers, Grassroots Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 85 (2007) (same) (link).
18
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fewer misdemeanor cases. Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 1, at 268 tbl.1.
19
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In that vein, I think the authors should have narrowed their exploration
to the counties where prosecutors appear to be overburdened
notwithstanding measured exercises of charging discretion. It is not
possible to say which counties adequately fit this description, but as a rough
proxy, we can use the counties where prosecutors exceeded the authors’
caseload limit while nevertheless filing a balance of misdemeanor and
felony charges.20 This measure includes the counties encompassing Miami,
Houston, Dallas, and Las Vegas—counties in which, on average,
prosecutors charged cases in the range of two-to-one or three-to-two
misdemeanors to felonies. But, even as to these counties, I would want to
know more about whether prosecutors are, in fact, making optimal charging
decisions. Only then would I unreservedly join the authors’ call to increase
funding substantially.
To my thinking, the principal shortcoming of the article is that the
authors fail to adequately differentiate between cases that are mala in se and
mala prohibita, between the serious and the petty, between the violent and
the non-violent. Consequently, they neglect to sufficiently ask the firstorder question of whether prosecutors are justifiably exercising (or failing
to exercise) charging discretion. To their credit, the authors do not leave
the discretion question wholly unaddressed, but notably, they raise it only in
the context of the most serious cases. For instance, the authors observe that
prosecutors lack the ability to eliminate even legally dubious cases because
―political pressure and a strong sense of justice likely prevent[] prosecutors
from outright dismissing charges against violent felony defendants.‖21
Notice the focus on violent felony cases. Admittedly, their analysis of
those cases may well be right, but significantly, they are talking only about
certain cases—a fraction of the whole. The picture they paint is
incomplete.
Moreover, this focus on felonies focus ultimately leads the authors to
make some curious claims. Consider their intimation that dispensable cases
are few and far between—that such cases are no more than a ―needle-in-thehaystack.‖22 Again, the observation may be true of violent felony cases, but
what about the rest of cases—the non-violent, typically non-felony cases?
In those cases, the relevant issue may not be to find the needle but to get rid
of all of the unneeded hay.
Likewise, consider the authors’ suggestion that ―most local district
attorneys have no choice but to use almost all of their budgets to handle
violent crime.‖23 Once again, the focus is on violent crimes to the almost

20

As indicated, the authors recommend a caseload limit of 150 felonies or 400 misdemeanors. See
supra note 2 and accompanying text. By this measure, a balanced caseload would seem to call for twoto-three misdemeanors for each felony.
21
Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 1, at 287 (emphasis added).
22
Id. at 289.
23
Id. at 298.
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categorical exclusion of all else. In any event, the empirical claim is almost
certainly wrong, as indicated by the authors’ own data that show that
misdemeanor cases, in fact, outnumbered felony cases by an aggregate
margin of nearly three-to-one in the studied counties. Even more telling, in
all five counties in which prosecutors, on average, handled the most
misdemeanors—that is, the counties encompassing Chicago, Houston, Fort
Lauderdale, Miami, and Las Vegas—prosecutors also managed felony
caseloads that met or exceeded the seventy-five felony upper limit. Quite
simply, in these counties, prosecutors appear to have had no trouble
charging misdemeanors notwithstanding their already high felony
caseloads. Of course, violent crimes probably require greater resource
expenditure per case, but the authors provide less-than-zero support for the
bold assertion that prosecutors are using ―almost all of their budgets‖ on
these serious cases. Rather, the only evidence the authors supply cuts the
other way. Here, then, it seems the authors have missed not only the
potential significance of misdemeanor cases but also their very existence.
III. ALLOCATING FINITE RESOURCES
Finally, even if I were convinced that prosecutors were exercising
charging discretion appropriately, I am not certain that I would support the
authors’ proposal to divide additional resources equally between
prosecution and defense offices. Specifically, the authors recommend that
the system should increase prosecutorial funding in lockstep with funding
for public defense.24 However, as an initial matter, the authors first must
demonstrate that there are no preexisting or endemic caseload or resource
imbalances that currently favor prosecutors. I am not certain that this is so.
To the contrary, my understanding is that—in the main, though not across
the board—prosecution offices tend to be better funded than public
defender offices and prosecutors are better compensated than public
defenders.25 I do not see much in their article to contradict this notion.
It should not have been difficult for the authors to compile data on
respective budgets. But rather than offer such figures, the authors provide
only a dubious analytic argument that purports to demonstrate that the
defense bar enjoys superior political clout. That is, they observe that
defense attorneys are in a ―far better position to generate press coverage for
themselves‖ and to thereby generate additional resources.26 Really? A
district attorney can more easily call a press conference than a defense
24

Id. at 267.
See Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice
Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219 (2004) (link); Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, Some
Associate Salaries Retreat from Their High but Remain Far Ahead of Salaries for Public Service
Attorneys, 4 (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.nalp.org/uploads/PressReleases/2010NALPSalPressRelease.pdf
(noting higher average salaries for local prosecuting attorneys in comparison to public defenders) (link).
26
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25
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attorney, and the public, thereafter, is more likely to give the prosecutor a
sympathetic ear. More generally, this notion of prosecutor-as-politicallydisempowered-adversary strikes me as a particularly unorthodox account of
the dynamic in criminal courts. This is not to say that the authors are wrong
(and, if they are right, I find the claim to be a fascinating inversion of the
traditional understanding and a worthy premise for a standalone article).
However, I need to hear more to adequately dispel the conventional wisdom
that prosecutors constitute the more influential interest group.27
Nevertheless, I wholeheartedly agree that all facets of the criminal
justice system (save corrections) are desperately cash-strapped and that any
politically feasible infusion of resources would generate more good than
bad. But I wonder whether—even if the authors are correct that prosecutors
are as underfunded as public defenders—there might not remain persuasive
reasons to direct a greater share of additional monies to public defense and,
consequently, to leave prosecutors with somewhat bigger caseloads than
public defenders. I recognize that for me—a former public defender—this
is a somewhat dangerous argument. I open myself up to an ad hominem
objection—one that the authors rehearse but, to their credit, reject—that
criminal law scholars (who the authors maintain are more likely to be
former public defenders than prosecutors) push a liberal agenda that
benefits their former colleagues and client bases.
However, there are powerful reasons beyond ideology to direct a
greater share of additional funding to criminal defense. First, a point that
relates directly to my earlier discretion discussion: public defenders need
more help because they cannot so readily help themselves through
legitimate choices over whether and how to proceed. Concretely, defense
attorneys—and not prosecutors—have diminished authority to regulate their
own caseloads. The busy prosecutor decides which little fish to throw back.
That is, she may forego charges as a matter of generally applicable policy or
where a defendant is insufficiently blameworthy or the evidence is
unconvincing in the individual case. Perhaps more importantly, she may
redirect resources from one set of cases to another. Put simply, a prosecutor
has the flexibility to make tradeoffs, and in doing so, she ensures that her
money goes further.
The defense attorney, by contrast, is not so fortunate. Professional
responsibility rules discourage the zealous defender from playing cases
against each other.28 And, of course, a defense attorney may not abandon a
case simply because her client is loathsome, irredeemable, or—more to the
point—clearly guilty.29 Occasionally, practical constraints may provoke a
defense attorney to logroll, but critically, she does so looking over one
27
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 534
(2001).
28
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2006) (link).
29
See id. R 1.16 (2006) (link).
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shoulder. At best, it is lamentable (albeit practical) for the defense attorney
to sacrifice the well-being of one client to the well-being of another; at
worst, it is unprofessional. Thus, a defense attorney must strive to devote
time and effort to each of her clients to accommodate concrete client
interests that almost certainly command more attention, on average, than the
abstract interests of the public or even the victim (where there is one).
The defense attorney is more constrained not only by professional
responsibility rules, but also by constitutional principles. Defendants—and
not victims or society—possess constitutional due process and trial rights.
The defense attorney (and the justice system more generally) must remain
responsive to these rights. The authors cede this point, but remarkably, take
it as a reason to worry less about defendants. Specifically, they see the
Constitution as something of a self-actualizing instrument that guarantees
sufficient resources for public defense.30
If only that were so.
Unfortunately, federal courts have been less than friendly to claims of
systemic ineffectiveness. In fact, I am not aware of even one successful
federal constitutional claim based on systemic underfunding.31 To the
contrary, courts have held that defense counsel’s effectiveness must be
measured only in the immediate case and, critically, only in light of existing
funding conditions.32 Put simply, the Constitution guarantees effective
representation, but federal courts have seen fit to leave discrete funding
questions to the political branches.33 Thus, as a matter of positive
constitutional law, due process and trial rights have done very little to keep
the money flowing. And because positive constitutional law has failed to
guarantee adequate funding for indigent defense, the political branches may
need to step up and do more. On this reading, a public policy choice to
allocate finite resources to indigent defense promotes not only defendants’
interests but also constitutional values that are underprotected judicially.34
Second, even putting the discretion question to one side, the authors
still may overestimate the administrative costs of cases to prosecutors and

30
Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 1, at 277 (―While indigent defendants can point to violations
of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, which give them access to the courthouse, prosecutors have
no such constitutional hook.‖ (footnote omitted)).
31
But cf. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 788–90 (La. 1993) (granting a claim of ineffectiveness
based on systemic underfunding but deciding the case under state, not federal, constitutional law) (link).
32
See Wright, supra note 25, at 246.
33
See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100–03 (1995) (reasoning that federal courts ought to leave
funding questions to the nonjudicial branches, particularly to government agencies) (link); see also id. at
112–13 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
34
Additionally, there is a somewhat more nuanced constitutional point: embedded in the
prosecutor’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a normative abhorrence for Type I errors
(wrongful convictions) as compared to Type II errors (wrongful acquittals). See In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 361–64 (1970) (link); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352 (―[B]etter that ten
guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.‖) (link). Respect for that principle would seem to
demand that we do more to ensure that public defenders are adequately funded.

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/26/

152

NO RT HW E ST ER N U NI VE RSI T Y LAW RE VIE W C O LLOQ UY

underestimate the administrative costs to defense attorneys. In particular,
the authors make the claim that ―prosecutors have many
obligations . . . which defense attorneys do not have to shoulder,‖ most
notably the obligation to meet with crime victims.35 But, of course,
prosecutors must coordinate with lay victims only in cases in which there
are lay victims. If I am right that a sizable proportion of cases are publicorder cases that involve no concrete victims, then the dynamic shifts
dramatically. In public-order cases, prosecutors typically need to interact
only with professionals—specifically, police officers with whom
prosecutors can expect to engage efficiently and predictably in a shared
language. For them, the immediate case is just one of many of a set type.
At the extreme, the officer and the prosecutor need not even speak in full
sentences, but may rely instead on acronyms and jargon designed to
streamline the process and push cases down familiar and well-traveled
paths.
By contrast, the defense attorney must deal with a typically lay (and
perhaps neophyte) client, who may be scared, frustrated, and distrustful—
ignorant of the law, procedure, and courthouse norms. It is defense
counsel’s job to walk her client through a potentially new world—to
explain to him not only his best legal interests, but the nature and function
of the process itself. And the obligations to hand-hold have only increased
since the Supreme Court’s landmark decision last term in Padilla v.
Kentucky, which held that effective representation must attend to more than
just the legal merits of the criminal case, but also to the immigration
consequences (and possibly much more).36
Third, the authors claim to be particularly worried that excessive
prosecutorial caseloads harm defendants. Indeed, the article’s very
subtitle—How Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal
Defendants—indicates that the authors’ animating concern is the potential
for such harm.37 But the authors appear to lack the courage of their
convictions. In fact, in some parts of the article they contradict their central
claim outright. Specifically, in the latter half of the article, they equivocate
and speculate, instead, that excessive caseloads generate ―windfalls‖ for
guilty defendants and impose costs on society in the form of chronic

35

Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 1, at 267.
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486–87 (2010) (link). Although I can speak only to my own experience as a
public defender in the Bronx, I often had to devote significant time to defendants in cases involving cutand-dry criminal-legal issues because those cases also implicated significant social and civil legal issues.
I felt that it was my responsibility (even pre-Padilla) to address those so-called collateral consequences.
37
The claim reappears throughout the text—for example, ―excessive prosecutorial caseloads are
very damaging to criminal defendants‖ and ―overburdening prosecutors is more harmful than helpful to
criminal defendants.‖ Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 1, at 279, 291.
36
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underconviction and underpunishment.38 But, of course, underconviction
and underpunishment are decidedly defendant-friendly outcomes.39
To my thinking, the authors’ ambivalence is probably not misplaced
(though it is reason enough to change the article’s title). Excessive
prosecutorial caseloads—like speedy-trial rules and other administrative
rules, standards, practices, and conditions—may produce a cacophony of
outcomes, hurting some defendants but helping others.40 Of course this is
speculation on my part, but that is just the point: any claim about whether
the defendant is harmed or helped is ultimately empirical. The authors also
speculate, leaning heavily one way before listing slightly the other. But
they offer their claims as fact, not supposition. Hence, my criticism is
twofold: they make no effort to falsify their empirical claims, and they fail
even to make these claims consistently.
Nevertheless, for present purposes, I will take the article’s title on its
own terms and assume that excessive prosecutorial caseloads do, in fact,
harm defendants. The question then becomes whether providing more
funding to prosecutors is the best solution. I am not convinced. The
authors’ contention seems to be that overburdened prosecutors may lack the
time and resources to examine the legal and equitable merits of the
immediate case. I share their concern, but I sense that the most efficient
way to address the problem may be to allocate more money to public
defense, not to the prosecution.
Consider the authors’ example—a robbery case. The authors deem
relevant a number of equitable factors: whether the defendant had ―a very
low IQ‖; whether ―he stole to support his family‖; whether he ―had fallen in
with a bad crowd after having previously been a good student‖; and
whether he has ―ties to the community, a high school degree, and . . . [is]
capable of handling a regular job.‖41 The authors believe that prosecutors
could and would turn to these questions, if only they had enough resources
to learn the answers. As I indicated earlier, prosecutors are perhaps more
unwilling to individualize than unable. In any event, my immediate point is
subtler: the defense attorney is probably better positioned to discern the
equitable particulars because she has more ready access to the sources of
such information—that is, to the defendant and his family and
acquaintances. Put simply, the defense attorney is more able to speak
directly and openly with the people who have firsthand knowledge about
38

Id. at 293–97.
Particularly, toward the end of the article, Gershowitz and Killinger observe that ―it is
undoubtedly true that excessive caseloads result in a substantial number of guilty defendants being
wrongfully acquitted or receiving plea bargain offers that are far too generous.‖ Id. at 293; see also id.
at 294 (―[P]rosecutors are simply no match for well-funded defense lawyers with adequate time to
devote to their cases.‖).
40
See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519–21 (1972) (link).
41
Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 1, at 264, 280, 282.
39
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the offender. Thus, if individualization is a principal goal (and I think it is a
good and worthy goal), then we ought to make sure that the defense
attorney has sufficient resources to glean the relevant information so that
she can educate the prosecutor thereafter. All else equal, we ought to
allocate money to the actor who can most efficiently engage in the requisite
investigation.
Again, I concede that this argument is speculative. I may be wrong; it
may be that the prosecutor is better situated to learn at least some of the
most relevant information—for example, information about the incident
itself, as opposed to information about the social circumstances of the
offender. (Or perhaps not, if we assume that the defendant is guilty and
therefore has firsthand knowledge about what transpired.) The question is
open, but critically, it is the right question to ask and answer before we start
allocating resources.
CONCLUSION
The authors explore a major failing of American criminal justice—the
fact that too many players are asked to do too much with far too little. But
at least when it comes to prosecutors, it is unclear how significant the
problem is. In any event, prosecutors have at their disposal a mechanism to
keep more money in place for the cases that matter to them most. Put
simply, prosecutors can charge fewer cases, and the logical place to start is
with the millions of petty public-order cases that inundate the nation’s
criminal courts each year—cases for which the charge and disposition are
sometimes more bookkeeping ritual than warranted crime-control or
retributive device.42
To do something about excessive caseloads, prosecutors first must
overcome the incentive structure that has motivated them to reflexively
charge the flood of petty cases that have come to clog the criminal justice
system’s pipelines.

42

Josh Bowers, The Unusual Man in the Usual Place, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 260, 273
(2009) (link).
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